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to meet the needs of actualpractice could not be achieved in law school;
they could only be achieved in the apprentice-likesetting of the law office
aftergraduationfrom law school. The other equally distinguishedspeakers
essentially agreed.'
Now, twenty five years later, we return to the same theme.
THE EDITORS

From Learned Profession to Learned Business
BAYLESS MANNING*

am committed to talk today about changes in the practice of the law
and their implications for law schools and legal education. I promise
that before I am done I will have circled in upon that topic.
A number of years ago, however, I took a private vow that I would
not write or speak in public about a matter of substance unless I could
end with "And therefore what we should do is. . . " There is a certain

appeal in the little verb "do." To be forced to say publicly what one
thinks we should "do" has great power for focusing the mind and for
sparking thoughtful debate and dissent. And if a "do" recommendation
ultimately should happen to inspire action, so much the better. So, before
I am done today I will put before you three practical proposals for
action.
As a practitioner facing the daunting task of addressing an audience
of professional academicians on an academic topic, allow me to begin by
declaring my conviction that one important function of our law schools
is forthrightly to perform as ivory towers-overtly proclaimed centers of
legal scholarship whose purposes are to expand knowledge and understanding about law. In my own case, I happen to harbor a certain antiquarian curiosity about ancient law as well as an abiding intellectual
interest in comparative legal anthropology-in the ways in which different societies go about trying to contain, I will not say resolve, the inevitable disputes of daily human life. I am therefore happy to urge that a place
2. See Jaffe, Howe, Halpern, Commentaries on Mr. Shea's Lecture, 12 BUFFALO L. REV. 280
(1963).
* Partner, Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison; Former Dean and Professor of Law,
Stanford Law School.
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for such non-implementational legal topics be saved on the work agenda
of our law schools.
But that is not today's topic. So I turn to that other part of a law
faculty's activity-training people to enter the legal profession. I offer
these remarks against the background of some thirty-eight years of migratory post-LLB life that has included fifteen years professing and deaning in law schools, sixteen years in private law practice and the rest
distributed among government service, corporate board room process,
legislative activity and international relations. My eyeglasses are ground
by that pattern of personal experience, and you should factor my remarks here accordingly.
On the whole, I think our law schools have been remarkably successful. Their success has lain in creating and honing that set of basic
analytic skills that we all recognize to be the hallmark of a first class
lawyer. These skills are a special combination of intellectual skepticism,
linguistic control, orderly reasoning, conceptual perception, a refined
sense of relevance, and an awareness of the key role of process and procedure. Development of this analytic legal capacity is our schools' strongest
contribution. It has been unique to American law schools. Although that
statement is an exaggeration today because, in the latter half of this century, American law schools have strongly influenced legal education in
other countries. Our law schools deserve great credit for their analytic
training, and for that I give them two rousing cheers.
But I withhold the third cheer. Why? Because our law facultiesand by that I mean not so much our law schools as institutions as our
law professors-could, and should, do a great deal more than they now
do-not to teach their students how to practice law-but to impart to
their students a more useful understanding of the law and legal process.
That leads to my three practical proposals.
LEGAL HISTORY AND INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT

First, some comments about legal history and the institutional context. While I feel strongly that no law student should be allowed to leave
law school without doing a substantial amount of reading, or without
taking a course in at least Anglo-American legal history, the point I wish
to press today about legal history is different and more general.
Our law shool's splintered curricula, our dedication to analytics, our
case book teaching materials made up of hundreds of disconnected snippets, our skeptical rejection of grand legal theorems, our open-ended
questioning techniques-all are to be applauded and are all indispensable
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in my opinion. But they have a cost. Such deconstructionist teaching
techniques inevitably produce an impression of disconnectedness in the
minds of students. It cannot be otherwise, as in the course of a day or
even an hour, the matters under discussion leap every few moments from
substance to procedure, from doctrine to fact, from lawyering to judging,
from individual equity to public policy, from Henry VII to the Warren
Court, from instrumental to aspirational. As mentioned, this is great educational technique, and we should keep it up. But students need an antidote - an antidote that would provide some element of reconstruction
and integration to this mass of disassembled atoms.
That which integrates the totality is, of course, history and institutional context. Any legal system is the product of its time, of its past, and
of the economics, politics and values of the society which gave rise to it.
Every case decided, every statute passed, in some way reflects that sweeping generalization. I believe that no classroom topic should be left without the professor's bringing to the attention of the student-or, better
yet, the student's bringing to his own attention-the degree to which the
particular chip of law under examination was uniquely a product of the
society and the era out of which it was born.
I think no person can have a hint of understanding about the legal
process without being a considerable historian. As professionals, we are
all engaged every day in hammering out and forging the next link in a
chain of legal development while at the same time seeking to predict
what tomorrow's link will be. It seems to me that one cannot hope to do
that without a sense of what the linkages were that led up to the present.
But my experience is that few graduates of our law schools have that
sense.
Of course, no professor and no student can "know" all that history.
And of course not every hour in the classroom must contain a history
lecture. But it is not difficult, and not significantly time consuming, for a
law teacher, through patient persistent reminders and questions, to sensitize his students to the pervasive, integrating, rolling cultural historical
process-the rich soil out of which the law grows. Holmes's dictum that
in the law a page of history is worth more than a book of logic is in fact
an understatement. But sadly, it is a dictum that is more often quoted by
law professors than followed as a guide in their teaching.
This macro point has a micro equivalent. If a statement of law is not
to be ephemeral it must be rooted not only in its general social context
and time, but in the particular institutional setting in which it arose. It is
no accident that water law in the arid west of the United States is not the
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same as in the verdant east, that debtors fare better under the law of
agricultural states than under that of urban banking states, or that third
party transferees win in commercialized environments while original
property claims are more honored in a land-based economy. If a student,
or a professor, in examining a particular legal encounter, does not perceive the environment surrounding it, does not locate it in its own institutional setting, he has little chance of understanding what it was about.
Further, he will consistently err in his effort to extend or extrapolate the
result into other institutional contexts. The outcome reached in one institutional context is in another at most an analogy. The law pertaining to a
sale of securities, for example, will have at most a secondary resemblance
to the law pertaining to the sale of a cow or of a house.
But most law students and law graduates seem to understand the
point hardly at all. In substantial measure because of a legal education
that focused mainly on deracinated words, law graduates are all too often
mesmerized by what the court or legislature said, to the disregard of
what they did. The young lawyer can all too often state what the court
held, but remain oblivious to the circumstances and setting in which the
facts of the case occurred and those in which the legal statements were
made. Certainly case method teaching is less deficient in this regard than
hornbook teaching. Yet, in disregard that one of the major potential advantages of the former lies in its fact-basing, that element usually gets
edited out by the casebook author and is usually not replaced by the
classroom teacher. Further, neither casebook nor hornbook provides any
sense of the surrounding social context of the lawmaking body that uttered the statements of law.
Even where a body of law is industry-specific, most law graduates
seem not to grasp, or to have been taught, the importance of the institutional setting. I cannot tell you how many young lawyers I have encountered who have taken a course in and know a good bit about SEC
regulations, but have not the faintest notion of the operations or economic functions of the stock market, or the role of stock exchanges as
institutional instruments for capital aggregation and economic transfer.
Or how many students I have seen who, having taken a course in negotiable instruments, can define a holder in due course, but have only the
haziest conception of what a bank does and virtually no knowledge of the
United States banking system (except that it has somehow been cleft
atwain by a legal axe called Glass-Steagall).
Law students are quite capable of learning about institutional settings, or at least being aware of them where they do not have the time to
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explore them. Responsibility for their lack of institutional knowledge and
curiosity lies squarely at the door of our law faculties. Though I do not
know why, our law schools somehow came to the conclusion many years
ago that law students are unable to read. Other graduate students lap up
three or four books a week; I put forth the radical hypothesis that law
students could handle three or four books a course. I have in mind expositional books, assigned as outside reading, relating to the institutional
workings and historical context of the subject under study. It is a perverse blindness that even allows us to think of teaching a law course on
regulating X without ever talking about X. But in our law schools we do
it all the time.
The law graduate's lack of a sense of institutional context is a major
contributing reason why young lawyers are so at sea when they leave the
law school and begin legal practice. Among the most startling things the
young lawyer encounters as he enters practice is the importance of the
institutional setting of the matter on which he is working. There is no
reason why every law student should not, by the time of his graduation,
be sensitive to that reality. Without overburdening their charges, particularly in their third year when, as we all know, most law students are
throttled back to half-speed, our law faculties could quite easily impart
that awareness. But they do not.
Practical ProposalNumber One, requiring no funding, no institutional reform, no faculty meetings and no overload of student or teacher.
By reading assignment, classroom exposition, and lectures by visitors,
law teachers should supplement their students' training in legal analytics
by greater emphasis on fact, institutional setting, and history.
THE INSTITUTIONS OF AMERICAN LAW

It has long been a second mystery to me why our law schools pay so
little attention to, and are so profoundly uninterested in, the institutions
of American law. By and large, our law students are provided only the
most rudimentary knowledge of the institutions of our legal process and
the legal profession. And except for an occasional empiric study on a
specific subject like sentencing, law professors devote very little research
effort to such matters.
We have immense court systems, federal, state, and municipal; the
attention of our law schools is riveted on the words these judges say, but
little or no time is devoted to how these courts run, their pathology, or
how they might be improved. This despite the common knowledge that
our court systems are quite literally in a state of operational crisis.

1988/89]

LEGAL EDUCATION

The average law graduate's knowledge of the operation of Congress,
state legislatures and local governments, if existent at all, has been
learned in undergraduate school or by personal work experience.
In the United States we have hundreds of thousands of lawyers doing all kinds of different things, but our law schools and students know
almost nothing of the sociology of the profession. The case is no different
with respect to our bar associations. National, state and local bar associations are engaged in countless activities, many of them contributory to
solving problems, some of them contributory to creating problems. But
so far as most of our law schools are concerned, these associations and
their activities might as well be on Uranus.
Prisons, in-house corporate law departments, small claims procedures, alternate dispute resolution tribunals, local police and FBI, grand
juries, law schools themselves, and dozens of other institutional components make up the skeletal structure of our vast legal process, but graduating law students typically know virtually nothing of these matters
because they are seldom mentioned in our law schools.
I have no doubt that this institutional ignorance on the part of our
law graduates contributes to the turnover that young lawyers experience
in their professional careers. The rate at which young law graduates
change their jobs after two or three years is astonishing. While some of
that turnover is healthy and normal, much of it is painful and expensive
to all concerned. And some of it is attributable to the new lawyer's discovery for the first time of what the working world of the legal process is
really all about.
It is not inevitable that that learning process be quite so haphazard.
There is no reason why our law schools could not through exposition,
visiting lecture and reading, provide much more information to students
about such subjects. Surely some such matters should appropriately be
perceived as promising fields for research.
May I name one that is ready at hand at this rostrum? While I am
flattered to be asked to address you today, it should not be a practitioner
who stands here talking about how the world of law practice is changing.
As I see it, I should be in the audience. You, as scholars, academics and
observers are the ones who have the perspective to discern what is happening in the larger currents of the profession, and to teach those of us
who are caught up in the daily frenzy of the practice. I can assure you
that out there in the trenches there is very little time available, and little
incentive, to observe, compare, reflect and deduce.
But we all know it to be a truth that there has been very little inter-
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est in such matters on the part of our law faculties. I believe that that
disinterest-is a source of consequent loss to young lawyers, the bar, and
the law schools themselves.
PracticalProposal Number Two, requiring no funding, no institutional reform, no faculty meetings and no overload of student or teacher.
By reading assignment, classroom exposition, and lectures by visitors,
law teachers should supplement their students' training in legal analytics
by acquainting them with the structures and operations of our principal
public and private legal institutions.
WHAT

Do LAWYERS Do?

I have mentioned the extraordinary turnover of new lawyers entering practice. Over the years I have paid some attention, albeit anecdotal,
to inquire into the causes of that turnover. Some young lawyers, of
course, simply do not perform well. But by far the largest number of
those who leave the profession do so because of some sense of non-congruence between their own personality, their expectations and the work
they are doing. They discover a personal non-fit between themselves and
the lawyer's job.'
Many young lawyers leave their employment in the law because
they are surprised by the work life they find, and discover that they do
not like it. Why did they not know that before? Some such incidents are
bound to occur, but why so many? The answer is that young lawyers who
come into a law firm typically have only the dimmest idea of what a
lawyer actually does. Their law school had taught them almost nothing
about that.
It is easy to say what lawyers do. They serve their clients.
It is also easy to say what clients want from their lawyer- particularly since all clients want the same thing.
A. The client wants, as an objective, to avoid or prevent something
that would be painful to him, or to contain something that will be painful
to him but is unavoidable, or to get something from somebody who does
not want to give it to him.
B. The client wants his lawyer to do something and/or advise him
on how to achieve the optimal trade-off between (i) full or partial
1. The reported story of Archibald McLeish is illustrative, if a bit extreme. He practiced law as
an associate in a Boston law firm until the day he was offered partnership, at which point he is
reputed to have said, "Great. That's what I've been waiting for. I quit. I want to be a poet."
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achievement of A and related cost, and (ii) risk of downside
consequences.
C. The client wants the lawyer to do B now--or sooner.
It is always the same. There are infinite variations-as playwrights
write variations on a few basic themes-but that is what clients want,
and what they pay us for. If we do not or cannot meet those demands,
clients will consider that they got poor service, and that we did not do
our job. They will be right.
Some of what the lawyer does in these regards is essentially the
straightforward "writing up" of a legal document recording or documenting a transaction. I believe there is little law schools can do to teach
students how to do that task well. Nor can law schools teach students
how to advise their clients, or what advice to give. A lawyer's capacity to
advise a client on what to do is a function of legal knowledge, experience,
exposure, being banged around a lot, acquaintance with others who have
experienced trouble before, a native talent for tactics and psychology,
knowing what and whom to ask, a smell for public relations, a feel for
the trade-off of short-term and long range goals, a sense of evolutionary
trends that grounds an ability to forecast, and- very high on the list-an
acute professional sensitivity that enables him to steer through the sudden, recurrent, wrenching moral dilemmas that beset the lawyer's daily
work. Such kaleidoscopic experience and insight cannot come from law
school. It comes to the working lawyer, if it comes at all, from going
around the track many times.
But what could be done in the law schools-and I cannot think why
it is not done, since it is easy and costs nothing-is to provide the student
an accurate picture of the lawyer's real life work with its daily operational crises and moral pressures. At the end of every case read, at the
end of every block of material discussed, one can see, if he will but look,
much of what the lawyer actually did or did not do. The student, or, if
not, the professor, should ask: "As an operational matter, what have I
learned'from this? How could I have helped these people avoid this
mess? What should these people have done instead of what they did?
What could (should) the lawyer have done? Did some, or all, or none of
them (or their lawyers) behave in a morally reprehensible manner? How
might I have constructed the transaction so that there would not have
been any dispute in the first place? What motivated these people to do
what they did? Were their motivations normal or aberrational, et
cetera?"
Is my point clear? I am not pressing for more so-called "clinical
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legal education". I am most certainly not arguing that the law school can
or should teach the student "how to lawyer"-how to make lawyerly
judgments or what to advise. But the law student could learn what it is
that good lawyers do, what the mission assignment is, and what will be
expected of him in the role of practitioner. And he can learn what it is
that is worthy to be learned from what he reads in law school.
The transition from the law school's focus on analytics to the law
firm's emphasis on, "what do I do with my legal knowledge to help my
client" is very difficult for many young law entrants to make. Throughout law school, no one ever asked them to make that translation. With
dismaying frequency, the new lawyer will respond to a work assignment
with a memo to a partner or client saying: "There are these arguments
here, and those arguments there, and on some occasions it is done this
way; on other occasions it is done that way, and it all depends on the
facts and the people involved, etcetra, etcetra." And there the memo
ends-totally blank in the respect that matters most. The partner or client then says, "Okay. That's very interesting. But what do you propose
that we-or the client-do now?" The new arrival either blurts out an
unconsidered impractical recommendation, or simply stands dumb.
It is as though meteorology students were to come out of school
having learned something about the forces that determine weather, but
having never been squarely confronted with an awareness that they will,
as practicing meteorologist, have to put themselves on the line with real
weather predictions. But even that analogy is tenuous. The meteorologist
merely forecasts, the lawyer is usually expected not only to forecast but
to act and advise on how to act.
Some new graduates quickly shift into lawyering gear as they enter
the law practice environment and come to perceive what is expected of
the working lawyer. But many do not. For some, the prospect of on-line
responsibility is terrifying. For others, on the other hand, the prospect of
the advisory or implementational role of the practitioner seems pale and
unexciting-a species of staff function far removed from the grander vision of the lawyer as statesman and doer so often implied in law school.
These young people leave the practice, declaring that they would rather
be a client and hire lawyers. And finally, it is no secret that many a
young lawyer leaves the practice because he discovers in real life that for
him it is unacceptably uncomfortable to apply the profession's traditional
separation between the lawyer's personal values and those of his client
when the two value systems clash-unacceptably uncomfortable to live
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by the profession's proud canon that lawyers can, should, must, work
diligently in the interest of even the vilest of clients.
Can our law faculties do anything to head off these jarring and expensive surprises encountered by the new lawyer? I believe so.
Practicalproposal number three, requiring no funding, no institutional reform, no faculty meetings and no overload of student or teacher.
By recurrent classroom attention, and lectures by visitors, law teachers
could do more to inform students of what the practicing lawyer really
does, what the service of clients is all about, and how to translate abstract
legal material into implementational form. The student can be taught to
ask habitually, "In the light of what I have just read, what would I have
done, and how would I have advised the parties and lawyer to behave?"
It would take no more than a shift of focus for law teachers to instill in
their students an awareness and the habits of operational thought. That
would be a great boon to students, to law firms and to clients. But it is
not much done in our law schools today.
PRACTICING LAW TODAY-AND TOMORROW

Now some more general observations about today's legal profession.
Page one of the financial pages of the September 11, 1987 issue of The
New York Times carries an unusually interesting article.2 It is addressed
to the "family farm" and what has become of that solid building block of
the American historical experience. It appears that three things have
happened to American family farms. Some have become parts of large
scale agricultural corporations. Other family farms are still family owned
but have been transformed into capital-intensive, skill-intensive, specialty-focused, high-technology businesses. Family farms in those two
patterns are prospering. The rest? They have either been driven to the
wall and disappeared, or they are economically marginal and moving in
that direction.
Most retailing and merchandising in the United States has undergone essentially that same evolution. In heavy industry, it is plain now
for all to see that industrial America-even the bastions of big steel and
big auto-has been forced in this generation to accommodate to the
forces of new technology, increasing capital requirements, competition,
marketing sophistication and specialization. Transportation? The experience is the same. Communications? Ditto. And everyone knows how rad2.

Stevenson, Farmingin a CorporateAge, N.Y. Times, Sept. 11, 1987, at D1, col. 3.
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ically the formerly stable worlds of commercial and investment banking
have had to restructure themselves in the past ten years.
Is it likely that the practice of law will escape these surging currents
that dominate the waning years of the Twentieth Century? All the evidence is to the contrary. In the legal world, the same kinds of changes are
not only happening-they have happened. Competition, advertising,
heavy capital requirements, sophisticated marketing, talent raiding,
deskilling, chain franchising - they have all suddenly become real in the
practice, and they are not going to go away.
We are clearly on the way to the creation of immense full-service,
multinational law firms. Whether they will achieve the scale of the Big
Eight accounting firms is not clear, but certainly, all of us have been
forced to raise again and again our earlier held conviction as to the maximum number of lawyers that can be orchestrated into a single law firm.
And a parallel development is obviously occurring all around us in the
growth of large, powerful legal capacities within corporations, governmental units and other large institutions. It is no longer unusual to find a
corporation with an in-house staff of 300 lawyers.
Does that mean that everyone who graduates from law school tomorrow will work in some giant organization? No. As in other areas of
services, a promising alternative strategy for a law firm today is intense
specialization-the boutique practice.
The twin phenomena of gigantism and specialization are not the
only measure of the change in the profession. A few months ago I gave a
talk before some 250 lawyers who make up the legal staff of one of our
larger corporations. My own remarks probably were not memorable, but
the conference itself was an eye-opener for me. Every aspect of the two
days of meetings was dominated by and expressed in the conceptual vocabulary of our business schools. All discussion was addressed to operating tactics for the legal function, enhancing legal produce, cost-benefit
analysis, personnel allocations, quality control techniques, deskilling,
networking electronic capabilities, product unit cost, packaging, retrieval
and rerun. The seminar was an exercise exclusively devoted to how to
perform the legal function more efficiently, faster and cheaper. The planners of this corporate department conference in these respects were out
ahead of most independent law firms today-but only marginally so.
Throughout the conference one could see clearly the manifest direction
of current trend lines for legal services, whether provided in-house or by
outside firm.
We should not be surprised. We have already seen a close counter-
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part development in the world of investment banking. In an earlier day
the company and its financial adviser, the investment banker, enjoyed a
congenial partner-like relationship that typically continued over decades
of mutually informed cooperation. Over the past 10 years that world has
evaporated, giving way to an intensely competitive deal-by-deal scramble
of comparison shopping. Relationship banking is out and transactional
banking is in. A chief financial officer of a company will dump any longstanding bank relationship for 20 basis points. The results? Our financial
markets are economically more efficient and cheaper. Obsolete structures
have been swept away. And we are experiencing an unparalleled surge of
creativity-a literal explosion of new financial ideas and products (some
of which will prove wonderfully fruitful and others disastrous). But the
by-product of this new atmosphere is clear; it has depersonalized, deindividualized, boiled-away, the close advisor-client relationships of an
earlier day.
The past decade's experience of the banking world, the evolution of
the family farm, the change in industrial America, the seminar just described, all foreshadow tomorrow's world of law practice. I will not pretend that I personally welcome the encroaching atmosphere of bottomline driven managerialism in law practice. But neither do I waste my
energy decrying it because it seems to me a quite inevitable product of
our era. Our work may not be becoming less learned, but what was a
learned profession is becoming a learned business.
What do these profound developments mean for our law schools? I
have not sensed that our law faculties have begun to think much about
that. Here are two observations that seem to me relevant.
First, with the sociological structure of legal practice in the United
States in a period of fundamental change, it is all the more important
that those changes become recognized in our law schools as legitimate
subjects for scholarship, research, observation, analysis and teaching. It
is simply poor scholarship to do otherwise. And it is inexcusable to allow
students to carry away from law school a vision of a career setting that is
vanishing, or has vanished. For the emerging law student, that is a recipe
for career disappointment, high turnover and professional frustration.
Second, much more serious-ultimately vital-is the brooding question. Can lawyers, in pursuit of a learned business preserve the ideals, the
values, and the service standards that were the crowning achievement of
law as a learned profession? It is never an easy job to instill high ideals in
human beings. It is harder still to build institutional structures that will
over long periods of time foster those ideals, and by example, incentive
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and sanction, see to it that the ideals are not only acknowledged but are
acted upon. In the case of the American legal profession, a loose alliance
of courts, bar associations, and law firms voluntarily undertook that mission in the law practice world of yesterday, and to an acceptable if not
exactly laudable degree, performed it. But how will that job be done tomorrow, and by whom? A shift from law as a learned profession to law
as a learned business does not inherently bode well for nurturing a sense
of the lawyer's work as something more than another market
transaction.
Most, perhaps all law schools include in their curriculum some
block of material dealing with what are usually called "legal ethics" and
the traditional canons of professional responsibility. In the main, the
scholarly attention devoted to such matters has been cursory, proforma
or less. But now, as the profession changes, it has become quite evident
that the simply expressed canons of the simply designed institutional
structures of the 19th Century must be rethought. They must be reshaped and reexpressed to achieve their original purposes in a new environment populated not by sole practitioners, individual proprietors, and
family farms, but by large scale, sophisticated, modem institutions made
up of long chain molecules, endlessly interlinked and interconnected. In
today's environment-as every corporation and government lawyer discovers-it has become increasingly difficult to even identify and isolate
who is "the client"-the lodestar concept of the profession's traditional
ethical compass.
Such rethinking and reconstruction is an intellectual task. It is one
in which our law schools can play a major role. Further, as these seismic
changes occur in the profession, it is predictable that commercialization
will take its toll. Something like a moral reawareness of the profession
will come to be needed. Our law schools should be the intellectual vanguard of that development. Dedicated not only to teaching, but to inspiring tomorrow's lawyers to understand, to nourish, to redefine and to
exemplify in new settings the nonmaterial service traditions of our
profession.
But our law schools will never be able to make those vital contributions unless they change their ways. They will not be able to do so unless
they commence to devote serious attention to institutional settings, to
our legal institutions present and past, and to the law as a practicing
profession. Not wholly by accident, those were the three practical proposals made earlier in these remarks.

